Many safety (risk) analyses depend on uncertain inputs and on mathematical models chosen from various alternatives, but give fixed results (implying no uncertainty). Conventional uncertainty analyses help, but are also based on assumptions and models, the accuracy of which may be difficult to assure. Some of the models and assumptions that on cursory examination seem reasonable can be misleading. As a result, quantitative assessments, even those accompanied by uncertainty measures, can give unwarranted impressions of accuracy. Since analysis results can be a major contributor to a safetymeasure decision process, risk management depends on relating uncertainty to only the information available. The uncertainties due to abnormal environments are even more challenging than those in normal-environment safety assessments; and therefore require an even more cautious approach. A hzzy algebra analysis is proposed in this paper that has the potential to appropriately reflect the information available and portray uncertainties well, especially for abnormal environments.
Introduction
Many safety (risk) analyses depend on uncertain inputs and on mathematical models chosen from various alternatives, but give fixed results (implying no uncertainty). While solving these types of problems may give insight to the analyst (an important benefit), there is a possibility that such results can give others an unwarranted impression of accuracy. There has been considerable noteworthy work [e.g., Klir (1993), Iman (1990), Breeding (1992)J on this problem, specifically emphasizing measures of uncertainty associated with analytical results and decisions. Conventional uncertainty analyses help, but are based on assumptions and models, the accuracy of which may be difficult to assure. Some of the models and assumptions that on cursory examination seem reasonable can be misleading. As a result, quantitative assessments, even those accompanied by uncertainty measures, can give unwarranted impressions of accuracy. Since analysis results can be a major contributor to a safety-measure decision process, risk management depends on relating uncertainty to only the information available.
Safety analyses are fiequently based on probabilities (e.g., probabilistic risk assessments). This approach almost always depends on models using logic structures (e.g., fault trees and event trees). It is appropriate to also consider "uncertain" inputs. The input uncertainty may be due to variability of potential input values, interpolation or extrapolation, measurement or human error, disagreements in interpretation, problem specification language vagueness or ambiguity, assumptions, simplifications or approximations, instrumentation resolution limits, sampling variability, etc.
One approach to describe input uncertainty is to use probability density hnctions (PDFs). For most safety problems, this is an approximation, which introduces another contribution to uncertainty. The use of fault trees and event trees and combinations (one of many alternatives) implies properties that are often difficult to meet (discussed subsequently), which introduces additional uncertainty. Even the manner in which the results are presented can be varied, thereby varying the impression given to a decision-maker. The analyst is another important factor. It is tempting for analysts to focus so much on mathematical correctness that they may lose sight of some of the contributions to uncertainty. The literature on attempted verification of "codidence limits," for example, demonstrates that these are generally underestimated Morgan (1990), pp. 57-59]. Also, review of unexpected-accident histories reveals numerous situations for which assurance based on safety analysis was overly optimistic.
The uncertainties due to abnormal environments are even more challenging than "conventional" (normal-environment) safety assessments; and therefore require an even more cautious approach. Although uncertainty must be handled very carehlly because of the above factors, safety analyses still afford the capability to contribute valuable information, since there is some semblance of natural order in almost all situations. The challenge is to do the best job possible of utilizing somewhat predictable phenomena, without being misleading about the uncertainty involved. This is the type of perspective that is most useh1 for the recipient of analytical results.
A fuzzy algebra analysis is proposed in this paper that has the potential to appropriately reflect the information available and portray uncertainties well, especially for abnormal environments. The application of f i z z y algebra is described, with emphasis on the differences (in concept and applicability) from PDF-based probabilistic calculus. The differences do not preclude transition from one to the other based on the amount of input knowledge available.
Fuzzy Algebra
Probability density (or distribution) concepts provide a framework in which uncertain parameters can be described and operated on mathematically, transcending some of the limitations of fixed numbers. Fuzzy logic [e.g., Zadeh (1 969, Kauhann (1 99 l), Ross (1993)l also extends capabilities beyond fixed numbers. Like probabilistic calculus, Fuzzy algebra also can be applied to introduce variability to fixed parameters. Fuzzy models can therefore be applied to represent uncertainty of parameters in probability analysis [Tanaka (1 983)], and this has some similarity to strictly probabilistic descriptions. However, fuzzy algebra differs from probabilistic calculus both mathematically and in concept. It appears to be more appropriate for the uncertain inputs applicable to abnormal environments, particularly if probability distributions are unknown and must be assumed.
A hzzy number (formally a convex and normal kzzy set) can be represented mathematically [Kaufmann (1 99 1) pg. 91 as:
where the U, and U, values on x represent the lower and upper limits, respectively, of the variation possible for the parameter as a hnction of a, and a is a "level of presumption."
The level of presumption represents a collection of subjective judgments2 about the range specified.
Fuzzy addition is specified3 as:
A " + F =[uF+b:,u,"+b,"] .
Fuzzy subtraction is:
Fuzzy multiplication is:
A" xB" = [u~b~,u,"b,"] .
(4)
Note that the above fhzzy algebra operations only utilize ranges of values, and make no use of or assumptions about relationships between probability parameters, or of independence between probability parameter^.^ The applicability of the operations shown is useful for parameters for which relative probabilities and independence are not well known (a common situation). On the other hand, probabilistic operations are limited to parameters for which these characteristics are well known (a less common situation).
In abnormal environment safety assessment, the input probabilities are often not known well, and the relations between possible probability values are not known well. The independence or dependence between inputs may also not be known well. However, we usually have access to expert judgment, along with limited data, which can be applied (to the appropriate extent) using fbzzy algebra.
The fbzzy algebra approach can transition toward the probabilistic approach as the amount of knowledge increases. It is also possible to combine probabilistic variables and fuzzy variables, as well as to combine probabilistic and hzzy characteristics in the same variable [Kaufhann (1991) pp. 79-88] .
Fault Trees. Event Trees. and Combinations
An undesired outcome (loss of system safety) can fiequently be described logically, leading to a "fault tree." The result of a sequence of occurrences can be described by a logical structure called an event tree (also scenario trees and event sequence trees). It is possible to glean most of the advantages of fault trees and event trees fiom combinations of the two.
Independence must be treated with great care. For example, although probability distributions can be added, subtracted, and multiplied; addition, subtraction, and multiplication of density fbnctions cannot be combined to solve a fault tree "or" fbnction (for uncertain variables), because independence cannot be maintained for the operations.
Therefore the solution is not straightfonvard for uncertain variables. For fbzzy uncertain variables, this constraint means that addition and then subtraction of their product must be done at each level of presumption, rather than first adding hzzy parameters and then subtracting their product. The above approach also extends to any number of variables.
In general, we would trace through a particular type of accident, using an event tree for the accident, combined with a fault tree for the response to the accident. For simplicity of illustration, only one specific type of accident was chosen as an example. One specifically chosen response failure is evaluated (logical "and" of three independent contributors. All inputs are represented both as probabilistic and as f b q variables. The fbzzy values are chosen for illustration. There is no justification for the probabilistic values; these are chosen only for range comparison. The result sought is the probability of a safety failure per year for the particular type of accident. For illustration, all constraints necessary for fault tredevent tree modeling are assumed to be satisfied.
The diagram below shows a combination event tredfault tree. The event tree branch is for the occurrence of some accident per year. The abscissa scale for the inputs are shown logarithmically (proportional to the log to the base ten of the probability). The outputs of the event tree are variables for which the lower and upper limits and the spread (uncertainty) are directly affected by all event tree branches. At this point, the response fault tree enters the computation. It shows that an undesired response can be due to a logical combination of effects described by uncertain variables (shown in hzzy and probabilistic form). The fault tree output is also an uncertain variable (also shown in both forms). The final output upper and lower limits (and spread) are affected by both the event tree output and the fault tree output. The combination of the event tree and the fault tree is through multiplication, representing an "and" operation, because the fault tree output is conditional on the event tree output.
Examples even as simple as this tend to illustrate how spread (uncertainty) grows as a result of the number of uncertain inputs. However, the spread indicated by probabilistic calculus is much smaller than the hzzy bounds because the assumption of probability distributions implies extra knowledge. The general conclusions are that complex event tredfault tree structures for describing abnormal environment response are almost certain to have substantial uncertainty, and the amount of uncertainty can be underestimated by using probability distributions that overassume knowledge
Conclusions
Systematic treatment of uncertainty has been approached in a large number of ways, some of which were reviewed above or in the references. Each of these approaches has applicability in particular situations. Qualitative decision-making-assistance algorithms [e.g., Saaty (1985) ] are becoming widely used because of quantitative analysis uncertainties. However, these are mostly heuristic-based. For abnormal environments, hzzy algebra structured with an event-tree-fault-tree combination is a mathematically correct reflection of the input data. It therefore could offer advantages over other approaches. This is basically because fizzy descriptions and the logical processing required are ideally suited to the knowledge base for most abnormal environments.
